

SAIG-ID

SUBJECT: 4<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division Detainee Operations Assessment Trip Report (CONUS Team)

and the Scouts brought detainees directly from point of capture to the BDE cage. <sup>1.5</sup> The only training for DO was basic skills (TCP) that covered searches, the 5S's, and handling of detainees. Law of war training was provided by SJA, but only classes given to large audiences. There was no scenario-based training or role playing to reinforce concepts. ROE cards were handed out at this training. There was no formal sustainment training on DO in theater, and replacements were brought up to speed by OJT by squad leaders or other experienced Soldiers. ROE was briefed daily (prior to missions and at guard mounts), with hot washes following each mission. Positive reinforcement of good actions and procedures was an important means of educating the Soldiers. (1.1, 1.2, 1.4)

The Engineers holding area was two rooms in a partially constructed monument on the grounds of a new palace site. Detainees would remain here from four days to four months, based on a sliding scale standard in a DIV FRAGO, but often exceeding the 14-day limit due to a clogged system. There were no MPs at this site, so the S2 was responsible for establishing and running this facility. The guard force was a rotating duty for all Soldiers, but mostly fell on HHC personnel. Food, water, and latrines were provided IAW division guidance. The Scouts transported detainees directly to the BDE cage. <sup>1.5</sup> Initially, in-processing of detainees was fairly simple – one CPA form per individual and one sworn statement per group of detainees captured during the same mission. After new guidance from DIV, the paperwork became burdensome, requiring multiple forms and statements for every individual, taking 2-4 hours to complete. The consequence of this taxing requirement was increased screening (interrogation) at the point of capture in order to weed out those worthy of detention, i.e., those with potential intel value or participants in significant criminal activity. While this forced troops to be more selective in deciding who to detain, it required them to engage in questioning (performed by PLs and PSs at the objective) despite their lack of training on tactical interrogation techniques. (1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4)

At the point of capture, detainees were zip-tied and blindfolded by whatever means handy. Vehicles for detainee transport that were readied prior to the mission were called in once the number of detainees was known (cargo HMMWV, LMTV, or 5-ton). There were adequate numbers of personnel and vehicles for transport of detainees. <sup>1.5</sup> Captured contraband was <sup>1.7</sup> inventoried and photographed. Depending on the items, they were either tagged and brought in to the BN TOC (evidence), destroyed on site (large weapons caches), kept for use by US or ICDC, or tossed in a river. (1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.5)

Interpreters were taken on all raids. THTs would only accompany the force on BDE-level missions (rare). <sup>1.7</sup>

<sup>b(2)-4</sup> [REDACTED] To fill this void, officers and NCOs at point of capture engaged in interrogations using techniques they literally remembered from movies. There is clearly a need for THTs at forward units to perform point of capture interrogations. In the absence of these, Soldiers need to be trained in basic tactical interrogation techniques. It's going to be done one way or the other, why not the right way? <sup>1.7</sup>

<sup>b(2)-4</sup>

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